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The Medical Peer Review Privilege After Virmani
In Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit handed down a decision that limited
the application of a long-standing privilege integral to North
Carolina's health care systems: the Medical Review Committee
Privilege.' The court refused to recognize the privilege, holding that
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining evidence to support his
discrimination claim outweighed the public health interest in
recognizing the Medical Review Committee Privilege.3  While the
ruling in Virmani is consistent with other federal courts' decisions,4
the Fourth Circuit's superficial treatment of the policy underlying the
privilege failed to achieve the depth of analysis found in other court
opinions. The Fourth Circuit did not examine the policies
fundamental to North Carolina's Medical Review Committee statute
as enunciated by the North Carolina courts. Moreover, it
mischaracterized the policies underlying the enactment of peer-
review statutes in other states.
This Recent Development examines the Court of Appeals's
inadequate analysis of the critical conflict between Dr. Virmani's
1. 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. The statutory privilege provides that a participant in a medical review
proceeding cannot be compelled to testify in any civil action regarding matters discussed
during the proceeding. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1999). Furthermore, the statute
grants to a member of a medical review committee immunity from any civil action arising
from any "act, statement or proceeding undertaken, made, or performed within the scope
of the functions of the committee." Id § 131E-95(a). Finally, the proceedings of the
medical review committee and the information and documents it produces are considered
confidential and not subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action
against a provider of professional health services. Id. § 131E-95(b); see also Charles David
Creech, Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67
N.C. L. REV. 179, 227 (1988) (surveying the peer-review privilege in other states and
discussing North Carolina's approach).
3. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293.
4. In addition, other federal courts also have declined to recognize the privilege. See
Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Group, 198 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Me. 2000) (declining to recognize
Maine's peer-review privilege in an anesthesiologist's action under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)); Holland v. Muscatine Gen. Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 385, 389-90
(S.D. Iowa 1997) (declining to recognize a privilege in a Title VII action); Robertson v.
Neuromedical Ctr., 169 F.R.D. 80, 83-84 (M.D. La. 1996) (declining to recognize a
privilege in an ADA case); Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 559-61 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (declining to recognize application of New York and New Jersey statutes in a
federal discrimination claim); LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188, 190-92 (S.D.
Ohio 1991) (declining to recognize a privilege in an alleged sex discrimination claim).
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fundamental right to access evidence for his discrimination claim and
the state's interest in ensuring quality health care.- The interest in
"ferreting out invidious discrimination ' 6 is extremely important in
today's society where "racism and discrimination are ... no strangers
to us in the United States."'7 Thus, the court's decision to uphold the
privilege was warranted in light of the policy interest of preventing
discrimination. However, by not giving the public policy underlying
the peer-review privilege its full effect, the Fourth Circuit has limited
the applicability of North Carolina's Medical Peer Review Privilege
in federal courts and may have affected adversely the application of
the privilege in North Carolina courts.
In addition to examining the Fourth Circuit's decision, this
Recent Development explores the alternative approaches available to
the court to protect the confidentiality concerns of the party seeking
to uphold the privilege, while still providing plaintiffs with access to
relevant evidence in federal claims.'
Medical peer review is one of the primary means of ensuring
quality patient care9 within the medical profession."°  A self-
5. See infra notes 35-102 and accompanying text.
6. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193 (1990).
7. Testimony of the National Coalition of Hispanic Health and Human Services
Organizations on H.R. 5540: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on Judiciary, 99th Cong. 70 (1986)
(statement of William A. Bogan, Vice-President of COSSMIO).
8. See infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text (discussing possible procedural
protections such as an in camera review and less intrusive discovery order).
9. State licensing board disciplinary actions, as well as medical malpractice suits,
regulate the quality of health care. Medical peer review, however, has become the most
widely accepted method of identifying and correcting substandard health care. See Susan
0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit-Is It Time for a
Change? 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 15 (1999) (noting that despite the existence of other
alternatives to monitor physician quality, "peer review has become widely accepted as the
primary means to weed out low quality physicians"); see also Christopher S. Morter,
Comment, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer
Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1988) (discussing the advantages of
having medical professionals as opposed to lay persons determine who are inadequate
hospital personnel).
10. See Morter, supra note 9, at 1120 (discussing peer review and the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986). Peer review originated with the establishment of the
American College of Surgeons ("ACS") in 1913 in an effort to improve the substandard
quality of care that existed in the early twentieth century. Not until 1952, however, did the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations ("JCAHO") adopt an
official procedure. See id. at 1116. Today, the JCAHO Accreditation Manual provides
the guidelines for peer review. Furthermore, maintaining a medical peer-review system is
a condition for JCAHO accreditation. See COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITALS, Medical Staff, § 3.1.6 (Joint Comm'n Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs.
2001) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL].
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regulatory mechanism, the peer-review process enlists doctors to
evaluate and critique the competency of their peers." Peer review
involves examining the credentials of physicians applying for staff
privileges within a hospital, as well as monitoring the quality of
patient care given by physicians who already possess staff privileges.12
Confidentiality is essential to meaningful and effective peer
review.13 Without the protections of immunity and confidentiality
that peer-review statutes afford, physicians may be reluctant to serve
on peer-review committees or to conduct meaningful peer reviews.14
Peer-review statutes enable physicians to identify problems in their
peers' performance and to take appropriate remedial steps without
the fear of retributive lawsuits or other negative consequences. 5
11. See Morter, supra note 9, at 1116-20; see also Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 8
(positing that medical professionals think that privileged information and insulation from
liability are the keys to effective peer review).
12. See George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and
Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2001) (noting
that in the credentialing process, the peer-review committee reviews a physician's training,
competence, and certifications); see also Morter, supra note 9, at 1116-17 (noting the
various peer-review functions promulgated by the JCAHO).
13. See Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970)
("Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and these
meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of
patients."), affd mem., 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14. The confidentiality and immunity provisions of the medical peer-review statutes
shield physicians from several adverse consequences resulting from their participation in
the peer-review process. These can include retaliatory measures taken by the physicians
who have received an unfavorable review, such as claims for defamation, discrimination,
or antitrust. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (upholding an antitrust
action against defendant physicians); Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 221 (Fla. 1984)
(holding that Florida's medical review statute protected the credentials committee's action
from introduction in a plaintiff's defamation action); Brandwein v. Gustman, 367 So. 2d
725,726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming the dismissal of a physician's defamation suit
against a fellow doctor). In addition, physicians conducting peer review also face potential
non-legal retribution in the form of lost referrals and admissions from the doctor under
review. Peer-review statutes that provide for confidentiality of the peer-review process
and immunity from liability are a direct effort to circumvent these concerns. See generally
Newton, supra note 12, at 727 (indicating that Congress and many state legislatures passed
peer-review statutes to protect the integrity of the peer-review process and to allay
participants' fears of personal liability); Creech, supra note 2, at 179-80 (noting that at
least forty-six states have statutes to protect the medical peer-review process because of
these concerns); Morter, supra note 9, at 1119 (stating that quieting the fear of
participating physicians has been the goal of most federal and state peer-review
legislation).
15. Morter, supra note 9, at 1118-20 (noting that defamation suits brought by
reviewed physicians as well as loss of referrals from reviewed physicians discourage
physicians from participating in peer review); see also Newton, supra note 12, at 727
(finding that a reluctance to criticize one's peers and a fear of lawsuits against participating
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Candid peer review ensures that incompetent or impaired doctors are
held accountable.16  The goals of peer review are to prevent
malpractice and ultimately improve the condition of health care.
Doctors participating in peer review can recommend that the hospital
board terminate or reduce the scope of the reviewed physician's
privileges to practice at the health care facility. In addition, peer-
review committees can recommend training, education, or monitoring
to improve the reviewed physician's deficiency.'7  Although some
questions surround the effectiveness of peer review, 8 an increased
concern for quality health care has resulted in both state19 and federal
legislation20  to protect the peer-review process. The effective
physicians resulting from adverse peer-review decisions discourages physician
participation in the peer-review process).
16. Although peer review effectively prevents an inept physician from practicing at a
particular hospital, it fails to prevent inept physicians from moving elsewhere to continue
their practice. Morter, supra note 9, at 1125. However, the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act provides for reporting to a national practitioner databank that
ameliorates this concern. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11133-11134 (1994 & Supp. V 1998). See Susan L.
Homer, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions,
Applications and Implications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 471 (1990) (discussing the
reporting provision of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986).
17. See COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 10, at §§ 3.1.6.1.3 to
3.1.6.1.5.
18. See, e.g., Scheutzow, supra note 9, at 8 (questioning the effectiveness of peer
review due to the low rate at which it occurs); Verner S. Waite & Robert Walker, Medical
and Surgical Peer Review, 168 AM. J. SURGERY 1, 1 (1994) (noting that hospitals
increasingly use peer review to serve their business interests); James R. Jensen, Medical
Staff Peer Review-A Peek Behind the Veil, Risk Management Reports vol. 2 (1998),
http:/vwv.riskmanco.com/Reports6.htm (criticizing the ineffectiveness of peer review
and citing such factors as review done by economic competitors, professional resentment,
and "good ol' boy" syndrome as responsible for the inefficacy of peer review).
19. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-502 (Michie 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-19a-17b (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-132 (2001); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
85/10.2 (West 2000); IND. CODE § 16-10-1-6.5 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1287
(West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. §§ 14-502 to 14-504 (2000 & Supp. 2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.25 (Anderson 2001);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 25-28 (West 1995); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 425.3 (West
1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-1.5 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-25 (Michie 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219 (Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-1 (1998); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1442 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.16 (Michie 2000); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.240 (West Supp. 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-3C-2 (Michie
1998); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 146.37 (West Supp. 2001); see also Brief of Amici Curiae The
North Carolina Hospital Association & The North Carolina Medical Society at 8, Virmani
v. Novant Health Serv. Corp. (In Re Knight Publ'g Co.), 350 N.C. 449, 515 S.E.2d 675
(1999) (No. 62PA97-2) [hereinafter Hospital Brief].
20. In 1986 Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,
§§ 402, 411-432, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101, 11111-11152 (1988), after recognizing the need to
protect physicians participating in peer review. Id. at § 11101(5). HCQIA provides
immunity to participants in peer-review proceedings for "damages under any law of the
United States or of any state... with respect to the action." Id. at § 11111(a)(1).
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functioning of peer review is a crucial means of safeguarding public
health, which has particular significance, especially considering a
recent study by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of
Sciences, estimating that as many as 98,000 hospital patients may be
injured each year as a result of medical errors."1
Strictly observed since its inception, North Carolina's Medical
Review Committee Privilegez represents a legislative choice to value
the confidentiality of the medical peer-review process over access to
relevant evidence in a civil action.13 Codified in the North Carolina
Hospital Licensure Act,24 the intent of the statute is to protect the
confidentiality of the peer-review proceeding.2 The statute provides
that the peer-review committee materials and records are (1)
However, HCQIA specifically does not extend this immunity to damages arising under
laws protecting the civil rights of individuals. Id. A distinction can be drawn, however,
between the granting of a privilege and providing immunity. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1216 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the peer-review privilege as "[a] privilege that
protects from disclosure the proceedings ... of a medical facility's peer-review
committee"). In the former situation, certain materials are privileged and cannot be used
in a civil action. In the latter context, the plaintiff's civil action is barred entirely. See id.
at 752 (defining absolute immunity as a "complete exemption from civil liability").
However, some courts have noted that denying a plaintiff access to the peer-review
proceedings effectively prevents a plaintiff's meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g.,
Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 223 (Fla. 1984) ("To deny discovery under these
circumstances is to deny access to the courts for redress of injury.") (Shaw, J., dissenting).
In addition, HCQIA does not provide any confidentiality measures to prevent the
discovery of peer-review materials. Id. at § 11137(b)(1). For a general discussion on the
Heath Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, see Morter, supra note 9, at 1120-30
(discussing the protection afforded by the Act and the nationwide system it created for
reporting incompetent physicians).
21. Public Citizen's Health Research Group: Questionable Doctors, http:ll
www.citizen.org/hrglqdsite/introduction.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2002) (citing a recent
study by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
22. North Carolina General Statute Section 131E-95 provides that the proceedings of
a medical review committee, as well as the materials and records it produces, shall be
confidential, and not subject to discovery in a civil action against a professional health care
provider. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (1999).
23. See Shelton v. Morehead Mem'l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76,82,347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986)
(stating that the purpose of section 131E-95 is to promote "candor and frank exchanges"
in peer-review proceedings); Cameron v. New Hanover Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 58 N.C. App.
414, 436, 293 S.E.2d 901, 914 (1982) (stating that section 131E-95 "represents a legislative
choice" that "embraces the goal of medical staff candor at the cost of impairing plaintiffs'
access to evidence").
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131E-75 to 131E-99. The Act states that its purpose is to
"establish hospital licensing requirements which promote public health, safety and welfare
and to provide for the development, establishment and enforcement of basic standards for
the care and treatment of patients in hospitals." Id at § 131E-75(b).
25. Id. at § 131E-95(b) ("The proceedings of a medical review committee ... shall be
confidential and not considered public records .... ).
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confidential, (2) not available to the public, and (3) "not subject to
discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action" resulting
from matters that are the subject of the committee's review.
2 6
North Carolina courts consistently have interpreted section
131E-95 broadly,21 as illustrated by Shelton v. Morehead Memorial
Hospital.28 In Shelton, a corporate negligence action, the plaintiff
sought to compel production of certain records held by the
defendants, the hospital and its former chief executive officer. In its
analysis, the court stated that section 131E-95 "is designed to
encourage candor and objectivity in the internal workings of medical
review committees. ' 29 The court recognized that the purposes of the
North Carolina Hospital Licensure Act are to promote the public
health, safety, and welfare and to provide for basic standards of care
and treatment of hospital patients.30  The confidentiality and
immunity provisions contained in section 131E-95 provide a crucial
means to that end.3' The court concluded that the privilege protects
both medical review proceedings and the records and materials that
the committee produces and considers from discovery. 2
Furthermore, the court determined that the privilege protects all
disciplinary investigations and hearings; peer evaluations and
recommendations to grant, continue, or discontinue staff privileges;
personnel information; credentials evaluations and recommendations;
and meetings and hearings of the executive committee of the medical
staff.33 Other courts, following Shelton's lead, have recognized and
supported the strong public policy favoring candid peer review by
26. Id.; see also Hospital Brief, supra note 19, at 8 (discussing the policy of
confidentiality embedded in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95).
27. See, e.g., Shelton, 318 N.C. at 80-84,347 S.E.2d at 827-30; Whisenhunt v. Zammit,
86 N.C. App. 425, 427-28, 358 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1987). In Whisenhunt, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals refused to allow a patient, the plaintiff in a negligence action, access to
Forsyth Memorial Hospital's credentialing records pertaining to the defendant doctor. 86
N.C. App. at 428, 358 S.E.2d at 116. The court stated, "The purpose of [section] 95 is to
promote candor in peer review proceedings, and we will not undercut that purpose." Id.
at 428,358 S.E.2d at 116.
28. 318 N.C. 76,347 S.E.2d 824 (1986).
29. Id. at 83, 347 S.E.2d at 829.
30. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-75(b) (1999).
31. Shelton, 318 N.C. at 82,347 S.E.2d at 828; see Hospital Brief, supra note 19, at 8.
32. Shelton, 318 N.C. at 86-87, 347 S.E.2d at 829, 831. The court did, however, note
that information used by the peer-review committee from sources available outside the
peer-review process is not protected. Id. at 83-84,347 S.E.2d at 828.
33. Id. at 88, 347 S.E.2d at 832.
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upholding the protections the statute affords and by yielding to
legislative intent.'
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Virmani v. Novant Health35
significantly reduces the effectiveness of North Carolina's Medical
Review Committee Privilege in federal court. In 1995, Novant
revoked Dr. Virmani's staff privileges after he punctured a patient's
iliac artery during a pelvic laparoscopy.36  Alleging that the
termination of his privileges constituted discrimination against him
based on his race and national origin,37 Dr. Virmani argued that the
hospital's peer review committee conducted its proceedings in a
discriminatory manner by treating non-Indian physicians differently
and disciplining them less harshly, thus violating 42 U.S.C.A. sections
198138 and 1985.19 In order to prove his claim, Dr. Virmani sought
access to "all peer review records related to all reviews for any
reason, during the twenty years preceding his request."4 Although
the trial court reduced the scope of his request to documents
pertaining to competency reviews of obstetricians/gynecologists in the
past fifteen years,4 1 it denied Novant's motion for a protective order a2
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 3
34. See Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp. (In Re Knight Publ'g Co.), 350
N.C. 449, 457, 515 S.E.2d 675, 681 (1999) (concluding that "the compelling public interest
in protecting the confidentiality of the medical peer review process outweighs the right of
access in this case"); Whisenhunt v. Zammit, 86 N.C. App. 425, 428, 358 S.E.2d 114 (1987);
see also Christina A. Graham, Comment, Hide and Seek- Discovery in the Context of the
State and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REv. 111, 125 (1999) (recognizing
that North Carolina courts have "adopted an expansive approach to the peer-review
privilege, and stretched the privilege to the outer limits allowed under [its] state review
statute").
35. 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001).
36. Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 127 N.C. App. 71,72,488 S.E.2d 284,
285 (1997). After investigating Dr. Virmani's practice, Novant's Medical Board
unanimously voted to recommend that the hospital's Board of Trustees terminate Dr.
Virmani's staff privileges. Id. at 73-74, 488 S.E.2d at 286. The Board of Trustees upheld
the decision. Id. Dr. Virmani sued, alleging breach of contract for the hospital's alleged
noncompliance with its bylaws with respect to the administrative processes under which
his staff privileges were revoked. Id. at 73, 488 S.E.2d at 285.
37. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (providing for equal rights under the law for all citizens in
every United States jurisdiction).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994) (proscribing conspiracy to interfere with an individual's
civil rights by impeding the due course of justice with the intent to deny an individual
equal protection under the law); Virmani, 259 F.3d at 285-86.
40. Virmani, 259 F.3d. at 286.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 293.
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The Fourth Circuit began its analysis with a structural explication
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. According to Rule 501, federal
courts are to determine whether to recognize an evidentiary privilege
by looking to an evolving federal common law of privilege that is
based on "reason and experience."'  The general test that courts
apply in assessing whether to recognize a federal privilege is whether
the privilege promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the
need for probative evidence.4 - Noting that evidentiary privileges are
not "lightly created"46 the court concluded that only those privileges
that are "the most compelling candidates" will overcome the "law's
weighty dependence" on the accessibility of evidence.47
Having laid the foundation for a Rule 501 analysis, the Fourth
Circuit began its substantive analysis. The court correctly identified
the issue as "whether the interest in promoting candor in medical
peer review proceedings outweighs the need for probative evidence in
a discrimination case."'  The court first considered Novant's
argument that the reasons underlying the Supreme Court's decision
in Jaffee v. Redmond 49 to uphold the patient-psychotherapist privilege
in a discrimination action should also apply in the present case.
Novant advanced three main arguments asserted in Jaffee: "the
privilege serves a compelling public end; rejection of the privilege
would result in only a modest evidentiary benefit; and all fifty states
and the District of Columbia have recognized the privilege. ' 5°
Without considering whether the public policies underlying the
medical peer-review privilege were analogous, the court rejected the
applicability of Jaffee due to the different context in which the
evidentiary issue arose.5 1 The court determined that because Dr.
Virmani's claim arose from the peer-review proceedings, the
44. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second
Chance-Testimonial Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 1
(forthcoming 2002) (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and defending the benefits
of a codified set of privilege rules).
45. Jaffee v. Richmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40,51 (1980)).
46. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 287 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974)).
47. Id. at 287 (quoting Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57,67 (3d Cir. 2000)).
48. Id.
49. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (recognizing as privileged the communications between a
psychotherapist and patient).
50. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 288.
51. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court recognized a "psychotherapist privilege,"
determining that the privilege would serve significant interests that outweighed the
"modest" evidentiary benefit that would be realized by denying the privilege. Jaffee, 518
U.S. at 11.
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circumstances differed from the situation in Jaffee, in which the
plaintiff sought materials produced in counseling sessions that
occurred after the event that gave rise to the lawsuit5 Instead, the
court viewed University of Pennsylvania v. EEOY 3 as controlling
precedent 4 The issue in University of Pennsylvania involved the
question of recognizing a privilege for materials that were considered
in the context of review proceedings for academic tenure. The Fourth
Circuit explained that "[t]he Court declined to create such a privilege
because it determined that the costs associated with discrimination
outweighed the costs that would ensue from the disclosure of peer
review materials."'55 Noting that, as in University of Pennsylvania, the
evidence that Dr. Virmani sought arose from the peer-review
proceedings themselves, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
interests served by the peer-review privilege did not outweigh the
costs associated with preventing Dr. Virmani from pursuing his
claim.56
Novant also advanced the holding in Jaffee that federal
recognition of a privilege under Rule 501 was confirmed by the fact
that all fifty states had enacted "some form" of the privilege, as the
"policy decisions of the States bear on the question whether federal
courts should recognize a new privilege. '57  The Fourth Circuit,
however, rejected Novant's argument, asserting that the policy
decisions of "some" states to enact peer-review legislation differed
from the policy decisions of other states." Therefore, the court
concluded that there was not enough of a consensus among the states
to warrant recognition of a federal privilege.5 9
As additional support for its holding, the Fourth Circuit also
examined the Health Care Quality Improvement Act ("HCQIA").6°
In 1986, Congress enacted the HCQIA in response to "an overriding
national need to provide incentive and protections for physicians
engaging in effective professional peer review."'61 HCQIA provides a
52. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 288.
53. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
54. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 288.
55. hM at 287 (quoting University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 193).
56. Id at 289.
57. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,12-13 (1996).
58. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit noted that the decision
in some states to enact peer-review legislation was based on the effect of the privilege on
plaintiffs in malpractice suits. Id. at 290.
59. Id. at 291.
60. See supra note 20 (discussing the HCQIA).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5). Other purposes of the Act include combatting the
increasing rate of medical malpractice and providing a national repository for reporting
1868 [Vol. 80
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qualified immunity for peer-review participants in federal and state
civil actions arising from peer-review participation.62 In addition, the
Act created a national repository in which to report adverse actions
taken with respect to a physician's staff privileges so as to prevent the
undetected movement of incompetent physicians.63 The court could
not conclude that Congress had considered and rejected a privilege
for peer-review materials when enacting the HCQIA 4 However, the
court determined that because Congress had created an express
exception to the immunity provision in the HCQIA for civil rights
claims, "Congress has considered the competing interests, [and] it has
not elevated the interest in encouraging peer review over the interest
in combating discrimination."'65
Finally, the court rejected Novant's contention that other circuit
court decisions supported recognizing the privilege.66 The court
concluded that the interest in obtaining relevant evidence in a
discrimination claim outweighed the interest that would be furthered
by recognizing a privilege for medical peer-review materials.67
adverse actions regarding physicians' staff privileges, so as to restrict the ability of
incompetent practitioners to move undetected to another hospital. Homer, supra note 15,
at 456.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (1988) (stating that physicians participating in peer review
that "meets all the standards specified ... shall not be liable in damages under any law of
the United States or of any State ... with respect to the action"). However, the Act does
not provide for immunity in civil rights actions.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11134.
64. However, in Cohn v. Bond, 953 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1991), affg Cohn v. Wilkes
Gen. Hosp., 127 F.R.D. 117 (W.D.N.C. 1989), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that the peer-review proceedings in an anti-trust action were privileged in
state and federal court. The court relied on the existence of the HCQIA to conclude that
Congress had endorsed the privilege, stating that the HCQIA "support[s] the public policy
which protects as privileged the medical review process." Cohn, 127 F.R.D. at 121.
65. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 292. However, the court does not acknowledge the
difference between granting absolute immunity from a discrimination claim and
recognizing a privilege in the context of a discrimination claim. See supra note 20
(explaining the difference between granting immunity and recognizing a privilege).
66. The Court found that the Seventh Circuit in Memorial Hospital v. Shaddur, 664
F.2d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) expressly declined to recognize a peer-review
privilege. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 292. In addition, the Court determined that in Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en bane),
rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985), the "Seventh Circuit did not address the issue
of whether peer-review documents should be privileged." Id. Finally, the Court
determined that United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 970 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1992)
did not even involve the issue of peer-review privilege. It at 292-93.
67. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 293.
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In Virmani, the Fourth Circuit faced an issue that required a
delicate balance of competing policy considerations.68 A plaintiffs
right to access relevant evidence to prove his claim is fundamental to
our adversarial system.69  Furthermore, eradicating unlawful
discrimination is an extremely important social goal. Conversely, by
enabling doctors to review their peers, the confidentiality that the
state medical peer-review statutes ensure ultimately safeguards public
health.70 The significant interest on both sides of this conflict demand
a fair and careful analysis. An examination of the Fourth Circuit's
opinion, however, reveals a discussion that focuses mainly on the
evidentiary difficulties encountered by a plaintiff seeking evidence
that is protected by the Medical Review Committee privilege. The
opinion does not explore adequately the public health issues that are
protected by the privilege.
First, the court's Rule 501 analysis was not as thorough as the
analysis from other courts that have encountered similar issues.
Aware of the significant nature of the issues involved, other federal
courts have engaged in a careful and conscientious discussion that
demonstrates an effort to respect state legislative and judicial
decisions to the extent possible.7' In applying Rule 501 in the context
of medical peer review, other courts have examined the policies
embodied in the state law privilege at issue.72 For example, the Court
68. See generally Newton, supra note 12, at 734-42 (providing a general discussion of
the competing policy concerns); Creech, supra note 2, at 205-07 (discussing the policy
debate between the privilege and the ability to access relevant evidence); Graham, supra
note 34, at 113 (noting that the public policy behind peer-review legislation is "noble" and
at the same time problematic because it prevents plaintiffs from acquiring evidence from
the peer-review proceeding).
69. See Creech, supra note 2, at 205-07 (noting that justice, public policy, and every
state constitution demands that plaintiffs be allowed to assert any legally recognized
claims).
70. Supra notes 9-34 and accompanying text (discussing the policy considerations
underlying the enactment of peer-review statutes).
71. See, e.g., Mattice v. Mem'l Hosp. of South Bend, 203 F.R.D. 381, 384 (N.D. Ind.
2001) (asserting that a federal court should, as a "matter of reason, experience, [and]
comity," take into account the law and the evidentiary privilege of the state in which the
claim arises); Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Group, 198 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (D. Me. 2000) (looking
to Maine's privilege in the first step of its Rule 501 analysis); Holland v. Muscatine Gen.
Hosp., 971 F. Supp. 385, 389 (S.D. Iowa 1997) (stating that the court should respect
privileges of the forum state); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 113 F.R.D. 677, 679 (N.D. Ind.
1987) (analyzing the application of Indiana's medical peer-review privilege "in the spirit
of" Rule 501).
72. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(stating that the Illinois Medical Studies Act's policy to bolster the effectiveness of peer-
review committees is substantial); Marshall, 198 F.R.D. at 4 (noting the significant policy
considerations behind Maine's adoption of peer-review legislation, and restricting
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Memorial Hospital for McHenry
County v. Shadur 3 stated that "a strong policy of comity" compels
federal courts to consider the law and policy of the state in which the
case arises in assessing whether to recognize a privilege as a matter of
federal law.74
The Fourth Circuit in Virmani, however, neither attempted to
examine North Carolina's crucial policy considerations surrounding
the confidentiality of peer-review proceedings, nor acknowledged any
deference to the North Carolina legislature's intent in the enactment
of the privilege, as set out in North Carolina court decisions. The
Fourth Circuit tentatively began a discussion of the policy concerns
implicated in medical peer review stating: "We agree with Novant
that the privilege it seeks would serve important interests." 75
However, this brief statement comprises the court's entire discussion
of these policies.76 Instead of taking the opportunity to explore the
interests advanced by the peer-review privilege, the court reverted to
its espousal of the evidentiary detriment Dr. Virmani would have
faced in his discrimination claim if it upheld the privilege.77
In addition to ignoring North Carolina's Medical Review
Committee Privilege and its underlying policies, the court also failed
to explore adequately the public health interests expressed in peer-
review statutes. This approach is evident where the court
distinguished Jaffee and instead viewed University of Pennsylvania as
disclosure to "narrowly tailored circumstances"); Brem v. Drs. DeCarlo, Lyon, Hearn, &
Pazourek, P.A., 162 F.R.D. 94, 97 (D. Md. 1995) (examining Maryland's medical review
committee statute as well as citing Maryland decisions that discuss the underlying policy of
the statute); St. Joseph's Hosp., 113 F.R.D. at 678 (asserting that policing the quality of
health care providers was an extremely high priority as evidenced by the General
Assembly's decision to enact peer-review legislation).
73. 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
74. Id. at 1061 (quoting United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976));
see also Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347 (D.N.M. 1998) (noting that
comity compels consideration of the New Mexico Legislature's conclusion that the public
interest in confidential morbidity and mortality conferences outweighs discovery of the
discussions in those conferences).
75. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 289.
76. Although the court addressed the policy considerations underlying peer review at
the beginning of its analysis, it did so in one sentence by recognizing that some courts have
determined that a privilege is necessary to encourage physicians to serve on peer-review
committees and to speak candidly if they do serve, otherwise, the quality of health care
would suffer. Id. at 287. This attempt to enumerate the policy concerns is perfunctory and
qualified by the words "some courts." Id This treatment of the public health issues
involved seems blithe, as well as inaccurate, for indeed, fifty states and Congress have
enacted some type of privilege to encourage medical staff candor. See notes 19-20.
77. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 289.
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persuasive. 7s  An obvious parallel exists between the University of
Pennsylvania and Virmani cases, as both deal with a claim of
discrimination arising from peer-review proceedings.79 However, the
costs associated with denying a privilege that protects faculty tenure
decisions are different than the costs associated with denying a
privilege for medical peer review."0 Denying the academic peer-
review privilege would reduce freedom in tenure decisions, whereas
denying the medical peer-review privilege could have the more
detrimental effect of sacrificing adequate health care. The Fourth
Circuit does not address this glaring distinction. The court's disregard
for the important difference between the policy concerns underlying
academic and medical peer reviews reveals an inadequate balancing
of the interests involved.
The Fourth Circuit also made a number of unfounded
conclusions and leaps in logic that demonstrate a superficial analysis.
First, in distinguishing Jaffee, the court concluded that a doctor's
sense of duty to the public at large, coupled with his personal desire
to maintain quality health care may "overcome any reluctance to
serve and be forthcoming on a peer-review committee, even in the
absence of a privilege.""1  Indeed, surveys demonstrate that the
opposite is true.' This conclusion fails to account for the doctors'
78. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the court's rejection of
the applicability of Jaffe to the case and its adoption of the reasoning of University of
Pennsylvania).
79. The Fourth Circuit emphasizes that University of Pennsylvania is especially
relevant to Virmani because in that case the discrimination charge arose from the
proceedings themselves. In further support of this argument, the court cites Marshall, 198
F.R.D. at 5, asserting that the district court refused to recognize a privilege "in part
because the suit alleged abuse of the peer review process." Virmani v. Novant Health
Inc., 259 F.3d 284,289 (4th Cir. 2001). However, the Fourth Circuit does not mention that
the other reason that the Marshall court did not recognize the privilege was that the
information contained in the peer-review proceedings had been disclosed already. See
Marshall, 198 F.R.D. at 5 (citing the viewing of the peer-review documents by plaintiff and
his psychologist as one of two bases to compel disclosure). In addition, the Fourth Circuit
relies on Holland, 971 F. Supp. at 385. However, partially influencing that district court's
decision was the fact that the relevant peer-review material was factual and not truly self-
critical in nature. See Holland, 971 F. Supp. at 391 (noting that disclosure of hostile work
environment claims were in the hospital's best interest).
80. The Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth that,
"[u]nlike the privilege claim for faculty tenure decisions ... the medical peer review
process 'is a sine qua non of adequate hospital care.' " 970 F.2d 94, 103 (5th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249,250 (D.D.C. 1970)).
81. Id. at 290 n.7.
82. For example, a Public Citizen's Health Research Group's survey analyzed data
compiled by the Federation of State Medical Boards, showing that the rate of serious
disciplinary action per 1,000 doctors was 3.49 in 2000. The director of the Public Citizen's
Health Research Group, Dr. Sidney Wolfe, stated, "When people are getting killed
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reluctance to participate in peer review without protection from
liability compelled fifty states and Congress to enact peer-review
privilege legislation in order to have effective peer review.' The
Fourth Circuit garners no support for its conclusion other than a
statement from an Ohio district court asserting that "most physicians
feel an ethical duty to the profession and to the public to keep the
standard of health care high. ' '&4 While physicians ideally feel an
ethical duty to keep the standard of health care high, they are
reluctant to police other members of their profession without the
protections peer-review privileges provideY
Furthermore, according to the Supreme Court in Jaffee, the
"policy decisions of the States bear on the question whether federal
courts should recognize a new privilege." 86  In support of that
contention, Novant argued that all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have enacted some form of medical peer-review privilegeY
The Fourth Circuit countered this argument, stating that at least
"some" states "appear[ed]" to have enacted the privilege based on
the policy decision that the interest in promoting candor among
medical staff members outweighs the interest of obtaining evidence in
malpractice claims.'s
By focusing on the discrete context of malpractice, the Fourth
Circuit narrowed the underlying public policy purpose considered by
because of crimes that continued because of an inadequate number of police officers,
people make that an issue. Well, this is a public health issue, a policing issue." Michael
Romano, More Docs Disciplined.- State Medical Boards Report Uptick in Actions;
Consumers' Group Unmoved, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 16, 2001, at 14, available at
http:llwww.modernhealthcare.comlarchive/main.php3 (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); see also R. A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
370-76 (1991).
83. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of state
and federal peer review legislation and the policies underlying the statutes).
84. LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188,191 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
85. See Morter, supra note 9, at 1119 (noting that while ethical considerations ideally
should motivate physician participation in peer review, historically they have not done so);
see also Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1346 (D.N.M. 1998) (stating that if
peer-review were open to discovery, physicians would not be as candid in their discussions,
thus substantially undermining the goal of improving health care); Newton, supra note 12,
at 726-27 (stating that despite the abstract notion that a physician's ethical duty of
improving the quality of health care might lead him to participate in peer review, reality
demonstrates that numerous disincentives thwart physician participation in the peer-
review process).
86. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,12-13 (1996).
87. Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259 F.3d 284,290 (4th Cir. 2001).
88. Id. at 290.
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state legislatures in the enactment of the peer-review privileges.89
The court relied on HCA Health Services of Virginia, Inc. v. Levin,9°
in which the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the Virginia statute
making peer review privileged is codified in the medical malpractice
chapter of the title on civil procedure. 91 However, the Levin court
totally refuted the argument that because the statute was codified in
the medical malpractice chapter the peer review statute was limited to
medical malpractice claims. 2 The Levin court stated that to restrict
the privilege to medical malpractice claims "ignores the underlying
purpose of the statute," which is "to promote open and frank
discussion during the peer review process.., in furtherance of the
overall goal of improvement of the health care system."93
The Fourth Circuit also relied on Eubanks v. Ferrier94 for the
contention that the decision to enact peer-review statutes involved a
choice between impairing a malpractice plaintiff's access to evidence
and fostering medical staff candor.95 However, in Eubanks, the
Supreme Court of Georgia also stated that "the purpose for the
enactment of [the peer-review statute] is to foster the delivery of
quality medical services by preserving the candor necessary for the
effective functioning of hospital medical review committees." 96
Therefore, the very cases on which the Fourth Circuit relied indicate
that the privilege was not enacted solely based on the policy
considerations found in the malpractice context. Instead, they
recognized that the overriding purpose of the privilege is to improve
the quality of health care by protecting physicians participating in
peer review, regardless of the type of litigation involved.
In addition, the Fourth Circuit stated: "There is no evidence that
state legislatures considered the potential impact on discrimination
cases of a privilege for medical peer review proceedings." 97 However,
one can infer from Indiana's peer-review statute, for example, that
89. The Fourth Circuit mentioned other reasons that legislatures considered when
enacting peer-review statutes, such as concern for liability for defamation and loss of
referrals. Id However, the Fourth Circuit focused on physician self-interest instead of the
underlying public health impetus in enacting the statutes. In other words, the state
legislatures were not enacting the statutes solely to protect physicians, but to protect them
for the purpose of improving quality health care.
90. 530 S.E.2d 417 (Va. 2000).
91. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290 (citing Levin, 530 S.E.2d at 420).
92. Levin, 530 S.E.2d at 420.
93. Id.
94. 267 S.E.2d 230 (Ga. 1980).
95. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 290.
96. Eubanks, 267 S.E.2d at 232-33.
97. Virmani, 259 F.3d at 291.
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the state legislature did in fact consider discrimination in enacting the
peer-review statute.9s Indiana explicitly acknowledged that they
would not extend immunity to actions that violate "any federal law
relating to the civil rights of a person." 99 The statute also provides,
however, for the confidentiality of the peer-review proceedings. 100
Because the legislature included a civil rights exception in the
statute's immunities provision without providing a similar exception
in the confidentiality provision, evidence does exist that at least one
state legislature and perhaps others considered the impact on
discrimination of a peer-review privilege.
Finally, by manipulating the policy discussion to apply only to
malpractice, the court was able to highlight the evidentiary inequities
that the discrimination plaintiff faces when his only evidence
allegedly lies in the peer-review proceedings themselves. However,
by focusing its discussion on the distinction between the medical
malpractice plaintiff, who can access evidence for his claim that exists
outside the peer-review proceedings, and the discrimination plaintiff,
whose ability to access evidence for his claim is limited severely by
the privilege, the Fourth Circuit's language leaves the sanctity of
privilege vulnerable in subsequent suits in which the plaintiff argues
his inability to prove a meritorious claim without access to peer-
review materials. For example, a claim for negligent credentialing
alleges that the hospital was negligent in giving staff privileges to the
physician.' A peer-review body makes the decision whether to grant
the physician these privileges. The plaintiff's only evidence is the
peer-review proceedings;"° therefore, after Virmani, the plaintiff
could more easily argue that he cannot otherwise prove his claim
without access to the peer-review proceedings. Thus, future litigants
are likely to rely on the Fourth Circuit's analysis to circumvent North
Carolina's Medical Review Committee statute.
98. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-30-15-1 to -15-23 (West 1999).
99. l § 34-30-15-20.
100. Id. at § 34-30-15-2 ("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person who
attends a peer review committee proceeding shall not be permitted or required to disclose:
(1) any information acquired in connection with or in the course of a proceeding; (2) any
opinion, recommendation, or evaluation of the committee; or (3) any opinion,
recommendation, or evaluation of any committee member.").
101. See, e.g., St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1997)
(alleging that the hospital was negligent in renewing an incompetent physician's staff
privileges).
102. The plaintiff, however, can discover the hospital's general credentialing policies
and use expert opinions as evidence to adjudicate a claim. See Humana Hosp. v. Superior
Court, 742 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
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The Fourth Circuit could have accommodated the confidentiality
needs of Novant, while at the same time allowing Dr. Virmani
adequate access to probative evidence needed to prove his claim. By
remanding the case to the district court with certain instructions, the
Fourth Circuit could have better alleviated Novant's confidentiality
concerns. First, the court could have ordered an in camera review of
the documents Dr. Virmani sought to determine which documents
were not relevant to his claim and thus unnecessary for Novant to
produce. The Supreme Court in Kerr v. United States District Court
for the Northern District of California 3 determined that an in camera
review order "is a relatively costless and eminently worthwhile
method to insure that the balance between petitioners' claims of
irrelevance and privilege and plaintiffs' asserted need for the
documents is correctly struck.' '1°4 Likewise, in Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons,°5 the Seventh Circuit suggested
that the trial court could have reconciled the parties' competing needs
by conducting an in camera review of the relevant documents' 6
Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the benefits provided by
an in camera review, it did not order one in Virmani.'7
Second, the Fourth Circuit could have ordered a more limited
discovery order that could have prevented the exposure of extremely
sensitive information. Although the district court limited the scope of
Dr. Virmani's discovery request in terms of time period and medical
specialty,' the order still spanned fifteen years and required
production of all documents relating to the competency reviews of all
obstetricians and gynecologists. °9 In order to accommodate Novant's
confidentiality concerns, the court could have limited the order to a
shorter time period or reduced the number of physician competency
reviews that it ordered Novant to produce.
Third, the Fourth Circuit could have required more than a mere
allegation of discrimination before affirming the district court's
discovery order."0 Once Dr. Virmani had demonstrated more than
103. 426 U.S. 394 (1976).
104. Id at 405.
105. 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984).
106. Id. at 1160.
107. See Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259 F.3d 284,287 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001).
108. Id at 286.
109. Id. at 287.
110. See, e.g., Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 113 F.R.D. 677, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (stating
that "the plaintiff [must] allege facts which create more than a mere inference that the
actions of the peer review committee were discriminatory, before the court will permit
even an in camera inspection [of the peer review materials]").
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an allegation of discrimination, the court could have shifted the
burden of proof to Novant to show legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons why it had suspended Dr. Virmani's staff privileges.
However, the Fourth Circuit's decision does not prevent a disgruntled
but justifiably discharged physician from alleging a discrimination
claim and having full access to all peer-review materials relevant to
his claim. Plaintiff's attorneys could use this tactic to access
documents that would not otherwise be available by alleging other
state claims.
Finally, the court simply could have acknowledged Novant's
confidentiality concerns. This acknowledgment could have
demonstrated that the Fourth Circuit would attempt to accommodate
the needs of both the parties involved to the extent possible. For
example, in Mattice v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend,"' the district
court stated despite its holding that the peer-review documents were
not privileged that "the Court appreciates the confidentiality
concerns raised by Memorial,""' and thus it imposed guidelines to
which the parties should adhere in handling the peer-review
documents. n3
In North Carolina, the Medical Review Committee statute has
provided a means for physicians to participate in effective peer
review. By not recognizing the statute in federal court, Virmani has
diminished the protection given to peer-review participants and thus
has undermined the public policy underlying North Carolina's peer-
review statute. However, the detrimental precedent that Virmani
established is not necessarily found in the outcome of its decision, but
rather in the analysis utilized to reach its holding. Subsequent state
and federal courts would be well served to use more circumspection
in their decisions when presented with similar issues involving the
Medical Review Committee statute. This will entail a more thorough
and careful analysis of the public health and safety issues that the
statute addresses. Furthermore, by implementing appropriate
limitations on the amount and type of discovery and evidence
obtained from peer-review deliberations, future courts could satisfy
the confidentiality concerns of the party seeking to uphold the
111. 203 F.R.D. 381 (N.D. Ind. 2001).
112. Id at 386.
113. Id. at 387.
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privilege, as well as protect the rights of physicians who are subject to
those proceedings.
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